The idea that logic is in some sense normative for thought and reasoning is a familiar one. Some of the most prominent figures in the history of philosophy including Kant and Frege have been among its defenders. The most natural way of spelling out this idea is to formulate wide‐scope deductive requirements on belief which rule out certain states as irrational. But what can account for the truth of such deductive requirements of rationality? By far, the most prominent responses draw in one way or another on the idea that belief aims at the truth. In this paper, I consider two ways of making this line of thought more precise and I argue that they both fail. In particular, I examine a recent attempt by Epistemic Utility Theory to give a veritist account of deductive coherence requirements. I argue that despite its proponents’ best efforts, Epistemic Utility Theory cannot vindicate such requirements.

中文翻译：

---

逻辑性与规范性

逻辑在某种意义上是思想和推理的规范这一观念是一种熟悉的观念。哲学史上一些最著名的人物，包括康德和弗雷格，都是其捍卫者。阐明这一想法的最自然的方法是对信念制定宽泛的演绎要求，以排除某些状态为非理性状态。但是，有什么能解释这种对理性的演绎要求的真实性呢？到目前为止，最突出的反应是以一种或另一种方式基于信念针对真理的思想。在本文中，我考虑了两种使这种思路更加精确的方法，并且我认为它们都失败了。特别是，我考察了认知效用理论最近给出的真实性尝试。演绎一致性要求的说明。我认为，尽管认知支持者尽了最大的努力，但认识效用理论并不能证明这样的要求。