Does shame have a place in a mature moral agent's psychology? Does it play a useful and positive role in morality? One skepticism that disputes shame's compatibility with mature moral agency or its being a useful moral emotion is that shame appears heteronomous in nature: We experience shame not because we have behaved badly by our own moral standards, but because we have been reproved by other people and suffered an injury to our social image. To mitigate this skepticism, this paper will propose a way in which we can reconcile shame with moral autonomy. Specifically, I will argue that a mature moral agent is vulnerable to shame because she cares a great deal about morality, and possesses certain character traits that dispose her to take others’ moral criticisms seriously. Occurrences of shame therefore are not always a threat to a moral agent's autonomous moral judgment.

中文翻译：

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耻辱与道德自治

耻辱在成熟的道德主体的心理中有地位吗？它在道德方面发挥有益和积极的作用吗？质疑羞耻感与成熟道德机构的相容性或它是有用的道德情感的一种怀疑论是，羞耻感在本质上是异质性的：我们经历羞耻感的原因不是因为我们的道德标准不佳，而是因为我们得到了其他人的谴责，并且损害了我们的社会形象。为了减轻这种怀疑，本文将提出一种使耻辱与道德自主权和解的方法。具体来说，我将辩称，一个成熟的道德主体很容易感到羞耻，因为她非常关心道德，并且具有某些性格特征，使她能够认真对待他人的道德批评。