Philosophical literature in normative ethics has tended to concentrate on (1) what we should do—what acts we should perform—or (2) virtues of character, understood as leading to the right deeds or (3), as most notable in Kant, the importance of motivation appraising agents and actions. All these elements—actions, virtues, and motives—are ethically significant. But there is a dimension of moral responsibility that should be given a place beside obligations to act, virtues of character, and appraisability of actions in relation to their motivation. It is the manner in which actions are performed. This can be right or wrong, an object of intention, and behavior for a reason; and it is important for assessing moral virtue. This paper explores manners of action, shows why they apparently do not reduce to kinds of actions, and proposes an account of their importance. The result is a wider conception of acting rightly than the common understanding on which it simply doing the right thing, a partial account of how acting rightly figures in the content of intention, and a sketch of the moral dimensions of the manners in which we act.

中文翻译：

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正确行事：道德行为的三个维度

规范伦理学的哲学文献往往集中在（1）我们应该做的事情-我们应该执行的行为-或（2）性格的美德，被理解为导致正确的行为，或（3），在康德中最为明显，动机评估主体和行动的重要性。所有这些要素（行为，美德和动机）在道德上都很重要。但是，除了行为义务，品格美德和与行为动机有关的行为可评估性之外，还有一个道德责任的范畴。是这样在其中执行动作。这可以是对也可以是错，可以是意图的对象，也可以是出于某种原因的行为。这对于评估道德美德很重要。本文探讨了行动方式，说明了为什么它们显然不归结为各种行动，并提出了其重要性的说明。结果是，正确行事的概念要比对简单行事的共识有更广泛的理解；部分地说明了正确行事是如何体现意图的内容的；以及对我们行事方式的道德层面的概图。