In his first paper, ‘Must We Mean What We Say?’, Stanley Cavell defended the methods of ordinary language philosophy against various charges made by his senior colleague, Benson Mates, under the influence of the empirical semantics of Arne Naess.¹ Cavell’s argument hinges on the claim that native speakers are a source of evidence for 'what is said' in language and, accordingly, need not base their claims about ordinary language upon evidence. In what follows, I maintain that this defence against empirical semantics applies equally well to experimental philosophy's attack on doing philosophy from the armchair. In so doing, I attempt to clarify – and adjust – Cavell's claim that statements about ordinary language are rule-descriptions that are neither analytic nor synthetic.

中文翻译：

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禁止野餐：Cavell on Rule-Descriptions

在他的第一篇论文“我们必须要表达我们的意思吗？”中，斯坦利·卡维尔为日常语言哲学的方法辩护，反对他的资深同事 Benson Mates 在 Arne Naess 的经验语义学的影响下提出的各种指控。¹卡维尔的论点取决于这样一种说法，即母语人士是语言中“所说内容”的证据来源，因此，他们关于普通语言的主张不必以证据为基础。在接下来的内容中，我坚持认为，这种对经验语义的防御同样适用于实验哲学对坐在扶手椅上做哲学的攻击。在这样做的过程中，我试图澄清——并调整——卡维尔关于日常语言的陈述是既非分析性也非综合性的规则描述的主张。