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Wittgenstein and Meaning
Philosophical Investigations Pub Date : 2021-01-25 , DOI: 10.1111/phin.12305
Charles Freeman‐Core 1
Affiliation  

The subject of this paper is something very general – namely, Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning. The concept of meaning necessarily brings with it other concepts, such as ‘subject’, ‘rule’, ‘language’ and ‘system’, and so we shall be concerned in one way or another with all of these too. However, our direct focus will be on the concept of the proposition, and our primary aim will be to clarify various category distinctions which determine this concept. The overall thesis which we shall argue towards is that there is more of a common conception of meaning between early and later Wittgenstein than is generally acknowledged, and that this common conception can be elucidated through the application of Kantian ideas.

中文翻译:

维特根斯坦与意义

这篇论文的主题是非常普遍的——即维特根斯坦的意义概念。意义的概念必然伴随着其他概念,例如“主体”、“规则”、“语言”和“系统”,因此我们也会以一种或另一种方式关注所有这些。然而,我们的直接重点将放在命题的概念上,我们的主要目的是澄清决定这个概念的各种类别区别。我们将要争论的总体论点是,早期和晚期维特根斯坦之间存在着比普遍承认的更多的共同意义概念,并且可以通过康德思想的应用来阐明这一共同概念。
更新日期:2021-01-25
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