It has been suggested that intuitions supporting the nonvacuity of counterpossibles can be explained by distinguishing an epistemic and a metaphysical reading of counterfactuals. Such an explanation must answer why we tend to neglect the distinction of the two readings. By way of an answer, I offer a generalized pattern for explaining nonvacuity intuitions by a stand‐and‐fall relationship to certain indicative conditionals. Then, I present reasons for doubting the proposal: nonvacuists can use the epistemic reading to turn the table against vacuists, telling apart significant from spurious intuitions. Moreover, our intuitions tend to survive even if we clear‐headedly intend a metaphysical reading.

中文翻译：

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可逆性是认识论的吗？

有人提出，可以通过区分认识事实的认识论和形而上学的解释来解释支持反可能性无虚无的直觉。这样的解释必须回答为什么我们倾向于忽略两种解读的区别。通过回答，我提供了一种通用模式，用于通过与某些指示性条件的跌落关系来解释非空位直觉。然后，我提出了对该提议表示怀疑的理由：非虚无主义者可以利用认知读物来反对虚幻主义者，从虚假的直觉中分辨出重要的意义。而且，即使我们清楚地打算进行形而上的阅读，我们的直觉也能幸存下来。