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A Referendum Experiment with Participation Quorums
Kyklos ( IF 1.796 ) Pub Date : 2020-09-03 , DOI: 10.1111/kykl.12256
Yoichi Hizen

This paper analyzes a yes/no referendum in which the outcome is valid only if the voter turnout is greater than a predetermined level. Such a participation quorum is argued to induce the minority group of voters to abstain strategically. Such abstention is intended to adversely affect the outcome by achieving a low voter turnout. We first construct a game-theoretic model to derive a theoretical prediction about the relationship between quorums and voting outcomes. It is shown that there exist multiple equilibria, and that strategic abstention can happen if such a participation quorum is imposed. To examine which type of outcome is more likely to be realized, we then conduct a laboratory experiment. We observe that (i) if the quorum is small, all voters go to the polls, and (ii) if the quorum is large, voters in the ex-ante majority group go to the polls, whereas voters in the ex-ante minority group tend to abstain. As a result, it is less likely that the ex-post minority group wins the referendum. However, when the quorum is large, it frequently happens that the outcome is made invalid because of low voter turnout.

中文翻译:

参与法定人数的公投实验

本文分析了一个是/否公告,其中结果仅在选民投票率大于预定级别时才有效。这种参与法定人数被认为会诱使少数选民有策略地弃权。这种弃权旨在通过实现低投票率来对结果产生不利影响。我们首先构建了一个博弈论模型,以得出关于法定人数和投票结果之间关系的理论预测。结果表明,存在多个均衡,如果强加了这样的参与法定人数,则可能发生战略弃权。为了检查哪种类型的结果更有可能实现,我们随后进行了一项实验室实验。我们观察到 (i) 如果法定人数很小,所有选民都会参加投票,以及 (ii) 如果法定人数很大,事前多数群体的选民参加投票,而事前少数群体的选民倾向于弃权。因此,事后少数群体赢得公投的可能性较小。但是,当法定人数很大时,经常会发生由于投票率低而导致结果无效的情况。
更新日期:2020-09-03
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