To face up to the COVID‐19 pandemic, firms closed their doors and global value chains that connected countries and economies were disrupted. The supply of goods and services contracted, resulting in a comparable contraction in demand for them. Demand for labour, which is derived from demand for goods and services, subsequently dropped. This applied to national labour in domestic labour markets and globally to migrant labour in countries of destination.

Since the 1970s, international labour migration performs two main functions in the Egyptian economy. It is an external outlet for the growing Egyptian labour force, which reduces pressures on the domestic labour market. It also is a source of financial remittances in hard currencies. In turn, these remittances carry out two functions. They help families that receive them meet their livelihood needs. This first function of remittances acquired increasing significance over the years and particularly since 2016 after the $12 billion loan agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) aimed at helping reduce the budget deficit, which meant large cuts in public expenditures and rising poverty rates. The second function of remittances is their contribution to the balance on current accounts, which closes the gap resulting from the chronic deficit in the Egyptian balance of trade. In the last five decades, tens of millions of Egyptian migrant workers left for employment abroad for periods averaging six years and returned to their country. Their main destinations were countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Libya and Jordan. Europe became a minor destination for Egyptian migrant workers in the last 30 years. Egyptian migration to North America and Australia was of the settlement type.

In the GCC countries, the pandemic coincided with the collapse in oil prices and consequently in oil revenues, which are the main determinant of their demand for migrant labour. The drop in this demand was thus magnified. It is unknown how many, but most certainly millions of workers either lost their jobs and returned to their countries of origin, or did not, and experienced wage cuts or delays in payments (Abella, 2020). Egyptian migrants were among these millions. The combined impact of the pandemic and of the drop in oil prices on Egyptian migrant workers extended to Jordan, their second destination at present behind Saudi Arabia. The impact on Jordan originates first in the public health measures it government adopted, and second in the consequences of the economic situation in the GCC economies for the Jordanian economy. These consequences are transmitted through both the shrinkage in the GCC demand for Jordanian goods and the effects of the said situation on Jordanian migrant workers in the Gulf. These workers’ financial remittances activate the Jordanian economy.

Like for other countries of origin, precise figures about the impact of the pandemic on Egypt are lacking. Data on returnees are not available. Neither are data on migrant workers remaining in countries of destination, who lost their jobs, or experienced wage cuts or delay in payments. One helpful development was the increase in financial remittances sent by migrant workers to their families in Egypt in the second quarter of 2020, as reported by the Central Bank of Egypt. This increase conforms with theory, which posits that migrant workers increase the sums they remit in times of crisis to help their families weather the hardships they experience. Another possible explanation for the increase is that travel restrictions constrained migrant workers to resort to banking channels and money transfer agencies, which resulted in reduced informal remittances. Egypt was not alone. Remittances similarly increased to other countries, such as Bangladesh, Kenya and Pakistan. However, in October 2020, the World Bank expected a drop in remittances to Egypt to US$ 24.4 billion in 2020, from US$ 25.5 billion in 2019. For all low‐ and middle‐income countries, the World Bank expected a drop in remittances of 7 per cent in 2020, followed by a further drop of 7.5 per cent in 2021 (World Bank, 2020).

These expectations present an opportunity to discuss the future of Egyptian labour migration so as to ascertain whether it can be counted upon in the future to perform the functions it has carried out in the past. Two factors were identified above that reduced the employment of migrant workers in the Gulf countries in times of the pandemic: public health prevention measures and the drop in oil prices. Certain analysts consider that demand for labour in the Gulf will bounce back to its erstwhile level as soon as the pandemic is over and the oil prices progressively recover in tandem with the resumption of the activities of the global economy. In what follows, these two factors will be discussed along with another three that also contribute to determining demand for labour in countries of the GCC. These are the purposive drive of these countries to adopt high value‐added methods of production, policies of labour force nationalisation, and attitudes towards migrants in general, which are at times tainted with xenophobic discourses.

In respect of the first factor, the public health prevention measures cannot be completely discounted in the medium and long terms. The Intergovernmental Science‐Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), a panel of experts established by the United Nations, in a report published at the end of October 2020, cautioned that in the future ‘pandemics are likely to be more frequent, deadly, and will spread more rapidly, unless we stop the widespread destruction of our environment’. This cautioning raises larger questions about the future and shape of globalisation. But, importantly, it portends that nation‐states will repeatedly decree close downs to protect their citizens, which should affect foreigners living in their territories and in particular migrant workers and their countries of origin.

The second factor is about the oil prices in their relation to economic activity. In spring 2020, some experts considered that such as economic activity rapidly contracted after the pandemic was declared, it would recover with the same speed when the virus was brought under control. As a result, demand for oil, its prices and revenues, the main determinants of demand for labour, would increase. This was a way too optimistic view. The virulence of the virus subsided during some of the nine months since the pandemic was declared and yet the economic activity did not resume at its previous pace. In fact, the incidence of the virus varied between countries, which logically adopted differential prevention measures thus hampering the functioning of global value chains, as pointed out above. A further cause makes it quite difficult for oil prices to recover to their former high levels: advance in techniques to extract shale oil has resulted in a glut in the market.

The third factor is the intended adoption of high value‐added methods of production that are capital‐ and knowledge‐intensive. It is completely rational that the oil‐exporting countries rely on their abundant factor of production, capital, rather than on their scarce one, labour. Capital should allow them to recruit the knowledge that they miss in their labour markets. From the vantage point of countries of origin, however, this means that fewer of their workers would find jobs in the GCC countries. It is true that high value‐added methods of production do not mean that demand for low‐skilled workers will totally disappear. It is equally true that Egyptian migrant labour in Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is high‐skilled but as a whole this is not entirely the case in other Gulf countries. The outcome is that a greater reliance on capital and knowledge should reduce demand for migrant labour, including Egyptian labour.

The fourth factor is the policies for the nationalisation of labour forces, such as the so‐called Saudization and Kuwaitization. The objective of these policies is to address the unemployment of nationals in the Gulf. Research in countries of destination, in Europe and the United States, has refuted the claimed causality between labour immigration and natives’ unemployment. Labour markets are segmented, migrant and national workers occupying different occupations. This is the reason nationalisation policies have been unsuccessful. Yet, in the future, they may have some effect, even though limited, which should reduce demand for migrant, including Egyptian, labour.

The fifth factor is the upsurge in the xenophobic discourse that at times targets Egyptian migrant workers, such as recently witnessed in Kuwait. So far, this hate discourse has rapidly receded. Yet, it could not be excluded that it results in a contraction of demand for Egyptian migrant labour.

Jordan, the second destination of Egyptian migrant workers, lives its own economic crisis at present. In the Gulf, its migrant workers are impacted by factors similar to those affecting their Egyptian colleagues. Therefore, the Jordanian demand for Egyptian labour could be expected to contract. Terms and conditions of labour in Jordan could also deteriorate, pushing Egyptian workers to return to Egypt.

The conclusion to draw from the brief analysis above is that labour markets in the Gulf and Jordan cannot be counted upon to absorb the same flows as in the past of Egyptian migrant workers. In any case, these flows represent diminishing ratios of the rapidly growing Egyptian labour force. As evidence for this conclusion, it may be useful to signal that according to the World Bank estimates, outward remittance flows from Saudi Arabia dropped by 17 per cent between 2015 and 2019, that is the year before the pandemic. This could only mean that migrant labour contracted, its disposable income diminished or both. In the best of cases, labour migration to the Gulf will not grow at its same previous rates.

To face up to this evolving situation, in Egypt as in other comparable countries of origin, a composite employment policy that generates decent jobs in the domestic labour market is required. This policy should contribute to producing goods and services for the Egyptian market as well as for exports that engender hard currencies, thus making up for the reduction in financial remittances or for their growth at lower rates than needed.

An additional observation is in order. Labour migration is selective. Demand in countries of destination is for specific occupations in determined sectors. Adoption of high value‐added methods of production means that demand for highly‐skilled workers, including, for example, for medical doctors, nurses and other medical professionals, will increase. Repeated pandemics in the future should generally raise demand for migrant labour in these occupations in the Gulf and in Europe. The COVID‐19 pandemic has reconfirmed in the last few months the existence of a significant deficit in medical occupations in most European countries. Migration, employment and education policies should take this into account, notably because Egypt already suffers from a high migration rate among medical doctors. The result is obvious. It is the difficulty of providing medical services in rural and poor areas.

Migration for employment will persist. Its drivers in countries of destination and origin, and in the functioning of the global economy, will not vanish. However, indications are that its efficiency in accomplishing the functions expected of it in Egypt will diminish.

The pandemic should be an opportunity to formulate sound and well‐considered policies that enable the Egyptian economy to carry out these functions.

为应对COVID-19流行病，公司关闭了大门，并切断了连接国家和经济的全球价值链。商品和服务的供应萎缩，导致对它们的需求也出现了类似的萎缩。由对商品和服务的需求衍生的劳动力需求随后下降。这适用于国内劳动力市场上的国家劳动力，全球适用于目的地国的移民劳动力。

自1970年代以来，国际劳务移民在埃及经济中起着两个主要作用。它是不断增长的埃及劳动力的外部出口，这减轻了对国内劳动力市场的压力。它也是硬货币金融汇款的来源。这些汇款又执行两个功能。他们帮助接收他们的家庭满足其生计需求。多年来，汇款的第一项功能变得越来越重要，尤其是自2016年以来，与国际货币基金组织（IMF）达成了120亿美元的贷款协议，旨在减少预算赤字，这意味着大幅削减公共支出和贫困率上升。汇款的第二个功能是其对经常账户余额的贡献，这弥补了埃及贸易差额长期赤字造成的缺口。在过去的五十年中，成千上万的埃及移民工人平均每年离开国外工作六年，然后返回自己的国家。它们的主要目的地是海湾合作委员会（GCC），利比亚和约旦的国家。在过去的30年中，欧洲成为埃及移民工人的次要目的地。埃及移民到北美和澳大利亚属于定居点类型。在过去的30年中，欧洲成为埃及移民工人的次要目的地。埃及移民到北美和澳大利亚属于定居点类型。在过去的30年中，欧洲成为埃及移民工人的次要目的地。埃及移民到北美和澳大利亚属于定居点类型。

在海湾合作委员会国家，大流行与石油价格暴跌同时发生，从而导致石油收入暴跌，而石油价格暴跌是其对移民劳动力需求的主要决定因素。因此，这种需求的下降被放大了。尚不清楚有多少但最确定的是数百万的工人失业或返回原籍国，或没有经历过降薪或付款延迟的现象（Abella，2020年））。埃及移民是这数百万人中的一员。大流行和石油价格下跌对埃及移民工人的综合影响延伸到约旦，这是他们目前仅次于沙特阿拉伯的第二目的地。对约旦的影响首先来自政府采取的公共卫生措施，其次来自海湾合作委员会经济体的经济形势对约旦经济的影响。这些后果既通过海湾合作委员会对约旦商品的需求减少，也通过上述情况对海湾约旦移民工人的影响而传递。这些工人的汇款激活了约旦的经济。

像其他原籍国一样，缺乏有关大流行对埃及的影响的准确数字。没有有关返回者的数据。没有关于留在目的地国，失去工作，经历过减薪或付款延迟的移民工人的数据。一个有益的发展是，根据埃及中央银行的报告，到2020年第二季度，移徙工人向埃及家庭寄出的金融汇款有所增加。这一增长符合理论，即理论认为移民工人增加了在危机时期汇出的款项，以帮助其家人渡过他们所经历的困境。造成这一增长的另一种可能的解释是，出行限制限制了移徙工人诉诸银行渠道和汇款代理机构，这导致非正式汇款减少。埃及并不孤单。汇往其他国家的汇款也有所增加，例如孟加拉国，肯尼亚和巴基斯坦。但是，到2020年10月，世界银行预计到2020年埃及的汇款将从2019年的255亿美元下降到244亿美元。对于所有低收入和中等收入国家，世界银行预计2020年下降7％，然后在2021年进一步下降7.5％（世界银行，2020年）。

这些期望为讨论埃及劳务移民的未来提供了机会，以便确定在将来能否履行其过去履行的职能。上面确定了两个因素，这些因素在大流行时期减少了海湾国家的移民工人的就业：公共卫生预防措施和油价下跌。某些分析家认为，大流行结束后，海湾地区对劳动力的需求将反弹至以前的水平，并且随着全球经济活动的恢复，石油价格逐步回升。接下来，将讨论这两个因素以及另外三个因素，这些因素也有助于确定海湾合作委员会国家的劳动力需求。

关于第一个因素，从中长期来看，不能完全轻视公共卫生预防措施。联合国成立的专家小组政府间科学政策平台生物多样性和生态系统服务（IPBES）在2020年10月底发布的一份报告中告诫说，未来“大流行病可能会更加频繁，除非我们制止对环境的广泛破坏，否则这种威胁将更加致命。此警告提出了有关全球化的未来和形式的更大问题。但是，重要的是，它预示着民族国家将反复下令关闭以保护其公民，这将影响居住在其领土上的外国人，特别是移民工人及其原籍国。

第二个因素是关于油价与经济活动的关系。到2020年春季，一些专家认为，例如，在宣布大流行之后经济活动迅速萎缩，在控制该病毒后，它将以相同的速度恢复。结果，对石油的需求，其价格和收入（决定劳动力需求的主要因素）将增加。这是一种过于乐观的看法。自大流行被宣布以来的九个月中，病毒的毒力减弱了，但经济活动并没有以以前的速度恢复。实际上，病毒的发病率因国家而异，如上所述，它们在逻辑上采取了不同的预防措施，从而阻碍了全球价值链的运作。

第三个因素是打算采用资本和知识密集型的高附加值生产方法。石油出口国完全依靠其丰富的生产要素，资本，而不是其稀缺的劳动力，这是完全合理的。资本应使他们能够吸收在劳动力市场上错过的知识。但是，从原籍国的角度出发，这意味着在海湾合作委员会国家中找到工作的工人更少。确实，高附加值的生产方法并不意味着对低技能工人的需求将完全消失。同样确实的是，阿曼和阿拉伯联合酋长国（UAE）的埃及移民劳动力技术娴熟，但总的来说，其他海湾国家并非完全如此。

第四个因素是劳动力国有化的政策，例如所谓的“声音化”和“科威特化”。这些政策的目的是解决海湾地区国民的失业问题。在欧洲和美国的目的地国进行的研究驳斥了所谓的劳务移民与当地人失业之间的因果关系。劳动力市场是分散的，移民工人和国民工人分别从事不同的职业。这就是国有化政策未成功的原因。但是，即使它们有限，将来它们也可能会产生一些影响，这将减少对包括埃及在内的移民劳动力的需求。

第五个因素是仇外言论的激增，这种仇视有时针对埃及移徙工人，例如最近在科威特目睹的情况。到目前为止，这种仇恨言论已迅速消失。但是，不能排除它导致对埃及移徙劳动力的需求减少。

约旦是埃及移徙工人的第二个目的地，目前正承受着自己的经济危机。在海湾地区，其移民工人受到类似于影响其埃及同事的因素的影响。因此，约旦对​​埃及劳动力的需求预计将萎缩。约旦的劳动条件也可能恶化，迫使埃及工人返回埃及。

从上面的简要分析得出的结论是，不能指望海湾和约旦的劳动力市场吸收与过去埃及移徙工人相同的流动。无论如何，这些流动代表着迅速增长的埃及劳动力的比例下降。作为该结论的证据，可能有用的信号是，根据世界银行的估计，从沙特阿拉伯流出的汇款在2015年至2019年（即大流行之前的那一年）下降了17％。这仅意味着移民劳动力收缩，其可支配收入减少或两者兼而有之。在最好的情况下，劳动力向海湾地区的迁移将不会以以前的速度增长。

为了应对这种不断发展的局面，在埃及和其他类似的原籍国一样，需要采取综合性的就业政策，在国内劳动力市场上创造体面的工作。这项政策应有助于为埃及市场以及产生硬通货的出口生产商品和服务，从而弥补金融汇款的减少或以低于所需水平的速度增长。

需要进行其他观察。劳动力移民是有选择性的。目的地国的需求是确定部门中的特定职业。采用高附加值的生产方法意味着对高技能工人的需求将增加，包括对医生，护士和其他医学专业人员的需求。未来，一再发生的大流行通常会增加海湾和欧洲这些职业中对移民劳工的需求。在最近几个月中，COVID-19大流行再次确认了大多数欧洲国家医疗职业的严重不足。移徙，就业和教育政策应考虑到这一点，特别是因为埃及已经遭受医生中移徙率高的困扰。结果很明显。

就业移民将继续存在。它在目的地国和起源国以及全球经济运行中的驱动力不会消失。但是，有迹象表明，它在埃及履行其预期职能的效率将下降。

大流行应该是一个机会，以制定合理的，经过深思熟虑的政策，使埃及经济能够履行这些职能。