This paper examines the phenomenon of declining announcement returns of serial acquirers. Using a classification of acquirers based on their patterns of acquisition, I find that decreasing returns occur mostly within “blocks” of acquisitions. This trend is driven by bidders who acquire targets quickly in chunks. In contrast, I find no evidence of any such decline in returns for the most active acquirers in the market of corporate control. I test several theories proposed by the prior literature to explain declining returns and find evidence consistent with temporary overvaluation, agency costs, and bidder learning as likely drivers.

中文翻译：

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连续收购者和收益递减：投标者的收购模式重要吗？

本文考察了连续收购方公告收益下降的现象。根据收购模式对收购者进行分类，我发现收益递减主要发生在收购的“区块”内。这一趋势是由快速分批收购目标的投标人推动的。相比之下，我发现没有证据表明公司控制市场上最活跃的收购者的回报会出现任何此类下降。我测试了先前文献提出的几种理论来解释收益下降，并找到与暂时高估、代理成本和投标人学习作为可能的驱动因素一致的证据。