When we carry out a speech act of stipulation, it seems that we can shape our language however we see fit. This autonomy, however, also seems to make such acts arbitrary: it is unclear if there are any constraints on what counts as a "correct" or "incorrect" stipulation. In this paper, I offer a novel, detailed account of the pragmatics of stipulation and explain its crucial role in conceptual analysis and articulation. My account shows that stipulation does indeed equip us with a key tool for changing our linguistic practices, but that such acts can nonetheless count as meaningfully, normatively constrained: they are always subject to felicitous criticism and the possibility of defeat by others. I then examine the metaphilosophical implications of this account. Philosophers often describe the project of conceptual analysis as having a crucial stipulative dimension, but they rarely explain what they take this act to consist in. On my view, speech acts of stipulation are best understood as acts that generate a shared inferential entitlement for speaker and audience, an entitlement justified on the basis of its utility. In developing this account, I distinguish stipulations from more familiar speech act kinds such as assertions and commands, synthesize and criticize alternative views of stipulation in the literature, and discuss the relationship between stipulation and seemingly kindred speech acts (such as assumptions, suppositions, and proposals).

中文翻译：

---

根据规定

当我们进行规定的言语行为时，似乎我们可以随心所欲地塑造我们的语言。然而，这种自主性似乎也使此类行为具有任意性：尚不清楚对于什么是“正确”或“不正确”的规定是否有任何限制。在本文中，我对规定的语用学进行了新颖而详细的描述，并解释了它在概念分析和表达中的关键作用。我的叙述表明，规定确实为我们提供了改变我们语言实践的关键工具，但这些行为仍然可以算作有意义的、规范的约束：它们总是受到恰当的批评和被他人击败的可能性。然后，我研究了这种说法的元哲学含义。哲学家们经常将概念分析项目描述为具有关键的规定性维度，但他们很少解释他们认为这种行为包括什么。在我看来，规定的言语行为最好理解为为说话者和说话者产生共享推理权利的行为。观众，一种基于其效用的权利。在发展这个叙述时，我将规定与更熟悉的言语行为类型（如断言和命令）区分开来，综合和批评文献中关于规定的替代观点，并讨论规定与看似相似的言语行为（如假设、假设和提案）。规定的言语行为最好理解为为演讲者和听众产生共同的推理权利的行为，这种权利基于其效用而被证明是正当的。在发展这个叙述时，我将规定与更熟悉的言语行为类型（如断言和命令）区分开来，综合和批评文献中关于规定的替代观点，并讨论规定与看似相似的言语行为（如假设、假设和提案）。规定的言语行为最好理解为为演讲者和听众产生共同的推理权利的行为，这种权利基于其效用而被证明是正当的。在发展这个叙述时，我将规定与更熟悉的言语行为类型（如断言和命令）区分开来，综合和批评文献中关于规定的替代观点，并讨论规定与看似相似的言语行为（如假设、假设和提案）。