The aim of this paper is to elucidate Franz Brentano's concept of immanent object through his own words and from his own perspective. The prevalent account of Brentano's revival of intentionality, his initial failure to distinguish between object and content, and his wrong-headed immanentism, is largely derived from his students. Brentano's objection to it, although well known, is seldom heeded. In fact, plenty of guidelines have been provided by Brentano himself in his writings on how his concept of immanent object is to be understood. I begin with his distinction between two senses of “object,” which, I argue, must be clearly set apart from distinction between two modes of object. I then examine three different interpretations of the term “in-existence”: the locative, the inherentist, and the objective interpretation. In the end, after dismissing the first two interpretations, I argue that Brentano is best understood as maintaining an objective and deflationary account of mental in-existence.

中文翻译：

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脑内还是颅内？论布伦塔诺的内在客体概念

本文的目的是通过弗朗茨·布伦塔诺的话语和他自己的视角来阐明弗朗茨·布伦塔诺的内在客体概念。关于布伦塔诺复兴意向性、他最初未能区分对象和内容以及他错误的内在论的流行描述很大程度上来自他的学生。布伦塔诺的反对意见虽然广为人知，但很少受到关注。事实上，布伦塔诺本人在他的著作中提供了很多关于如何理解他的内在客体概念的指导方针。我从他对两种“对象”意义的区分开始，我认为，这必须与两种对象模式之间的区别明确区分开来。然后，我研究了对“存在”一词的三种不同解释：位置解释、内在解释和客观解释。到底，