This essay clarifies Edmund Husserl's view of “pure” concepts, with a view to its contemporary metaphilosophical significance. It is argued that Husserl's conception of pure concepts is unique in that he allows overlap between pure and empirical concepts. This overlap leads to a potential for confusion between pure and empirical concepts which I label “amphiboly,” following Kant's use of the term. The essay begins by clarifying Husserl's view of the divergence in concept formation between empirical and pure concepts, and then articulates the specific properties of pure concepts that allow an empirical overlap. These properties include the modality and range of the extension of the concepts, the ordering of objects under the concept, and the mental faculty required to identify an object under the concept. Once we see the source of amphiboly in Husserl's view, it can be observed that many concepts of interest to philosophy, even outside phenomenology proper, are potentially subject to amphibolous uses. Thus, Husserl's view can be a general hermeneutical resource for clarifying the nature of philosophical concepts.

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胡塞尔关于纯粹概念和经验概念的重叠

本文阐明了埃德蒙·胡塞尔关于“纯粹”概念的观点，着眼于其当代元哲学意义。有人认为，胡塞尔的纯概念概念是独一无二的，因为他允许纯概念和经验概念之间存在重叠。这种重叠导致了纯粹概念和经验概念之间的混淆，我将其标记为“amphiboly”，遵循康德对术语的使用。本文首先阐明了胡塞尔关于经验概念和纯概念之间概念形成分歧的观点，然后阐明了允许经验重叠的纯概念的特定属性。这些属性包括概念外延的形态和范围、概念下对象的排序以及识别概念下对象所需的心理能力。一旦我们在胡塞尔的观点中看到了两栖的来源，就可以观察到许多哲学感兴趣的概念，即使是在现象学本身之外，也可能受到两栖的用途的影响。因此，胡塞尔的观点可以成为阐明哲学概念本质的一般解释学资源。