In this paper I clarify a major affinity between Nietzsche and Spinoza that has been neglected in the literature—but that Nietzsche was aware of—namely a tendency to etiology. Etiologies provide follow-up, second-order explanations of first-order matters that have already otherwise been decided. The example I take up here is Nietzsche's and Spinoza's rejections of free will—and especially their etiologies concerning how we wrongly come to think that we may boast of such a capacity. In working through the former (i.e., their rejections of free will) in order to make my central metaphilosophical point regarding the latter (i.e., their accounts of why we generally affirm that we have free will), I shed important new light on Nietzsche's relation to Spinoza. I also further our understanding of what role such second-order accounts play within each of their larger projects on their own terms.

中文翻译：

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尼采、斯宾诺莎和病因学（以自由意志为例）

在这篇论文中，我阐明了尼采和斯宾诺莎之间的一个在文献中被忽视的主要亲和力——但尼采意识到了——即病因学的倾向. 病因学为已经确定的一阶问题提供了后续的二阶解释。我在这里举的例子是尼采和斯宾诺莎对自由意志的拒绝——尤其是他们关于我们如何错误地认为我们可以夸耀这种能力的原因。在研究前者（即他们对自由意志的拒绝）以提出我关于后者的核心元哲学观点（即他们对为什么我们普遍肯定我们拥有自由意志的解释）时，我对尼采的关系有了重要的新认识给斯宾诺莎。我还进一步了解了这些二阶帐户在其每个大型项目中以自己的方式发挥的作用。