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Reasoning and grasping objects
European Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-09-24 , DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12598
Rea Golan 1
Affiliation  

There is a pervasive view that inference—as opposed, notably, to a grasp of objects—is an intralinguistic process that does not draw on extralinguistic resources. The present paper aims to show that this dichotomy between inferring and grasping objects can be resisted. Specifically, I offer an alternative view: a phenomenological account according to which our most basic inferences draw on our grasp of objects. I motivate this account on the grounds that, although it is restricted to such basic inferences, it has significant implications for the general question of whether inference involves taking one's premises to support one's conclusion. The proposed account implies that basic inferences need not involve corresponding “takings,” (even though such inferences involve conceptual content), but it leaves open the possibility that non-basic inferences do involve corresponding “takings,” while relying on basic inferences. It will turn out that such a disjunctive view, according to which non-basic reasoning is somewhat parasitic on basic reasoning, manages to avoid many of the problems with which the literature on the “taking condition” deals.

中文翻译:

推理和把握对象

有一种普遍的观点认为,推理——尤其是与对对象的把握相反——是一个语言的过程,它不依赖于语言外资源。本论文旨在表明可以抵制推理和抓取对象之间的这种二分法。具体来说,我提供了另一种观点:一种现象学的解释,根据它,我们最基本的推论是基于我们对对象的把握。我提出这个解释的理由是,尽管它仅限于这样的基本推理,但它对于推理是否涉及以一个人的前提来支持一个人的结论这一一般问题具有重要意义。提议的解释暗示基本推理不需要涉及相应的“接受”(即使这种推理涉及概念内容),但它留下了非基本推理确实涉及相应“接受”的可能性,同时依赖于基本推理。事实证明,这样一个分离的观点,
更新日期:2020-09-24
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