The purpose of this paper is threefold: First, I provide a framework – based on Sellars' distinction between the manifest and the scientific image – for illuminating the distinction between liberal and ‘orthodox’ scientific naturalism. Second, I level a series of objections against expanded liberal naturalism and its core commitment to the autonomy of manifest-image explanations. Further, I present a view which combines liberal and scientific naturalism, albeit construed in resolutely non-representationalist terms. Finally, I attempt to distinguish my own (Sellars- and Peirce-inspired) position from the very similar pragmatic liberal naturalist view, that of Huw Price. I do this by suggesting that a ‘monistic’ Peircian evolutionary naturalism which accepts the Sellarsian scientia mensura principle not only is consistent with ungrudging recognition of the irreducibility of normative facts and the plurality of our discursive practices, but also shows how this irreducibility, by being understood in terms of an evolution-by-selection of a population of perceptual-practical-inferential habits, can be at the same time considered as naturalistically explicable – without any appeal to an expanded manifest-image conception of nature.

中文翻译：

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迈向改革后的自由和科学自然主义

本文的目的有三个：首先，我提供了一个框架——基于塞拉斯对显象和科学形象的区分——来阐明自由主义和“正统”科学自然主义之间的区别。其次，我对扩展的自由自然主义及其对显像解释的自主性的核心承诺提出了一系列反对意见。此外，我提出了一种结合了自由主义和科学自然主义的观点，尽管它是用绝对非代表性的术语来解释的。最后，我试图将我自己的（受 Sellars 和 Peirce 启发的）立场与非常相似的实用主义自由主义自然主义观点 Huw Price 的观点区分开来。