We examine the association between relationship lending and the likelihood of bank loan covenant violations. We find that relationship lending reduces the probability of ex‐post covenant violations. The length of the lending relationships has an inverted U‐shaped effect on the likelihood of covenant violations. The borrowers and lenders both benefit from relationship lending, but long‐term lending relationships weaken the borrower's bargaining power.

中文翻译：

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关系贷款和银行贷款契约违反

我们研究了关系贷款与违反银行贷款契约的可能性之间的关联。我们发现，关系贷款减少了事后违反公约的可能性。借贷关系的长度对违反公约的可能性具有倒U形的影响。借款人和贷方都受益于关系贷款，但长期的借贷关系削弱了借款人的议价能力。