In their foundational work, List and Pettit formalized the judgment aggregation framework and showed that the preference aggregation framework from social choice theory can be mapped into it, arguing that the reverse was not possible. We show that a natural extension of a graph-theoretic representation of the preference aggregation framework indeed allows us to embed also the judgment aggregation framework. Moreover, we show that many concepts from the two original frameworks match up under the new one, show that it is possible to detect “logical consistency” with graph-theoretical properties, and give a new nuanced comparison between the doctrinal paradox and the Condorcet paradox.

List和Pettit在其基础工作中对判断汇总框架进行了形式化处理，并表明可以将社会选择理论中的偏好汇总框架映射到其中，并认为不可能做到相反。我们证明了偏好聚合框架的图论表示的自然扩展确实允许我们也嵌入判断聚合框架。此外，我们表明，两个原始框架中的许多概念在新框架下相匹配，表明可以用图论性质检测“逻辑一致性”，并在教义悖论和孔多塞悖论之间进行了细微的比较。 。