Yes, but one needs to assume that consumers know the realized price distribution, and that they do not know which firm has what price. Even with identical consumers and identical firms, if firms set prices in a first stage, and if consumers search sequentially in a second stage, then price dispersion arises in the form of a mixed strategy subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium. In contrast to Burdett and Judd (1983), price quotes are not required to be “noisy.” Moreover, actual search is predicted to be nontrivial.

中文翻译：

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价格分散能否仅靠信息摩擦来支撑？

是的，但是需要假设消费者知道实际的价格分布，并且他们不知道哪个公司的价格。即使有相同的消费者和相同的公司，如果公司在第一阶段设置价格，并且如果消费者在第二阶段顺序搜索，那么价格分散也会以混合策略子游戏完美的纳什均衡的形式出现。与Burdett和Judd（1983）相比，报价不必是“嘈杂的”。此外，实际搜索被认为是不平凡的。