ABSTRACT

In her paper “On the Nature of Judgment”, published in 1919 in Mind, Dorothy Wrinch aimed at understanding how Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgement might be made to work. In this paper we will focus on Wrinch’s claim that on the theory it is impossible, as it should be, to judge nonsense. After having presented the prima facie objection to the theory created by nonsense and what we can take her solution to such a problem to imply (§1), we will show how Wrinch can resist the two main objections that have been moved to such a solution, whether as explicitly attributed to Wrinch or discussed without mentioning her. The conclusion will be, contrary to what one might be tempted to think, that even if there might be reasons to take the multiple relation theory as doomed, Wrinch was the first to show us that nonsense is not one of those reasons.

摘要

在她的论文《论判断的本质》中，发表于 1919 年的Mind, Dorothy Wrinch 旨在了解如何使罗素的多重关系判断理论发挥作用。在本文中，我们将重点关注 Wrinch 的主张，即根据理论，不可能，正如应该的那样，判断胡说八道。在对胡说八道产生的理论提出初步反对意见以及我们可以将她对此类问题的解决方案暗示的内容（§1）之后，我们将展示 Wrinch 如何抵制已转移到此类解决方案的两个主要反对意见，无论是明确归因于 Wrinch 还是在未提及她的情况下进行了讨论。结论将是，与人们可能会想的相反，即使有理由认为多重关系理论注定要失败，Wrinch 是第一个向我们表明，胡说八道不是这些原因之一。