ABSTRACT

Do Buddhist philosophical commitments support a particular theory of well-being? Most authors who have examined this question argue that Buddhist ideas are compatible with multiple theories of well-being. In this paper, I contend that one tradition of Buddhist philosophy—Abhidharma—does imply a specific theory of welfare. In particular, Abhidharma supports hedonism. Most Ābhidharmikas claim that only property-particulars called dharmas ultimately exist and I argue that an Abhidharmic theory of well-being should only refer to these properties. Yet the only dharmas that could plausibly be intrinsically good are phenomenal properties that are good in virtue of how they feel. Thus, the only intrinsically good things are pleasures. I defend this surprising conclusion from various interpretative objections and show that my argument can also inform contemporary philosophical debates about welfare.

摘要

佛教哲学承诺是否支持特定的幸福理论？大多数研究过这个问题的作者认为，佛教思想与多种幸福理论兼容。在这篇论文中，我认为佛教哲学的一个传统——阿毗达磨——确实暗示了一种特定的福利理论。特别是，阿毗达磨支持享乐主义。大多数 Ābhidharmikas 声称只有称为dharmas 的财产细节最终存在，我认为阿毗达摩的幸福理论应该只涉及这些财产。然而唯一的佛法可能本质上是好的是现象特性，它们是好的，因为它们的感觉。因此，唯一本质上好的东西就是快乐。我从各种解释性反对意见中捍卫这个令人惊讶的结论，并表明我的论点也可以为当代关于福利的哲学辩论提供信息。