The Coase Theorem has a central place in the theory of environmental economics and regulation. Its applicability for solving real-world externality problems remains debated. We first place this seminal contribution in its historical context. We then survey the experimental literature that has tested the importance of the many, often tacit assumptions in the Coase Theorem. We discuss a selection of applications of the Coase Theorem to actual environmental problems, distinguishing between situations in which the polluter or the pollutee pays. Most substantive examples of Coase-like bargaining involve more than two parties. It is not clear whether the outcomes of these bargains were Pareto optimal rather than merely Pareto improving. While limited in scope, Coasian bargaining over externalities offers a pragmatic solution to problems that are difficult to solve in any other way.

科斯定理在环境经济学和调控理论中具有中心地位。它在解决现实世界的外部性问题上的适用性仍存在争议。我们首先将此开创性的贡献放在其历史背景下。然后，我们调查实验性文献，这些文献检验了科斯定理中许多通常是默认的假设的重要性。我们讨论了科斯定理在实际环境问题中的一系列应用，以区分污染者或被污染者所支付的情况。类似Coase的讨价还价的大多数实质性示例都涉及两个以上的方。尚不清楚这些讨价还价的结果是否是帕累托最优的，而不仅仅是帕累托改进的。虽然范围有限，