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The effect of continuous-time cheap talk in the experimental minimum effort game
Applied Economics Letters ( IF 1.287 ) Pub Date : 2021-03-10 , DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2021.1884828
Hisashi Toku 1 , Tatsuhiro Shichijo 1 , Kazuhito Ogawa 2
Affiliation  

ABSTRACT

We experimentally investigated whether continuous-time cheap talk improves the effort level in a minimal effort game with multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. In each round of the game, a player freely changes the message before he or she makes decisions, and constantly monitors other members’ messages. We have two results. First, continuous-time cheap talk realizes a higher effort level than does one-shot cheap talk. Second, the group in which every member chooses the maximum effort in the first two rounds eventually achieves an efficient outcome.



中文翻译:

连续时间廉价谈话在实验性最小努力游戏中的作用

摘要

我们通过实验研究了连续时间的廉价谈话是否在具有多个帕累托排名的纳什均衡的最小努力游戏中提高了努力水平。在游戏的每个回合中,玩家在做出决定之前可以自由更改消息,并不断监视其他成员的消息。我们有两个结果。首先,连续一次的廉价交谈比一次性交谈便宜。第二,每个成员在前两轮中选择最大努力的小组最终取得了有效的结果。

更新日期:2021-03-11
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