Surveillance practices, both state and non-state in origin, are deployed increasingly to solve social problems beyond the traditional domains of criminal justice and national security, including public health concerns. Although such “protective” forms of surveillance are proffered by the state as beneficial for those under surveillance, they nonetheless retain coercive dimensions in practice and require the labeling of a group as “risky” in order to justify their use. Following Shelley Bielefeld’s (2018) observations about protective state surveillance as a form of paternalism, and Jennifer Musto’s (2016) notion of “carceral protectionism,” this article uses a case study of the electronic monitoring of people with cognitive impairments to identify the carceral features of paternalistic surveillance and to explore how this practice is justified. I make the argument that, specifically through targeted vulnerability and distortions of risk, paternalistic surveillance practices can operate as a mode of carceral expansion.

起源于国家和非国家的监视实践越来越多地用于解决刑事司法和国家安全传统领域之外的社会问题，包括公共卫生问题。尽管国家提供的这种“保护性”监视形式对被监视的人有利，但它们在实践中仍然具有强制性，并且需要将一个群体标记为“有风险”，以证明其使用是正当的。继雪莱·比勒菲尔德 (Shelley Bielefeld) (2018) 对作为家长制形式的保护性国家监视的观察，以及詹妮弗·穆斯托 (Jennifer Musto) (2016) 的“监狱保护主义”概念之后，本文使用对认知障碍者进行电子监控的案例研究来识别监狱特征家长式监督，并探讨如何证明这种做法是合理的。