Epistemic feelings like tip-of-the-tongue experiences, feelings of knowing, and feelings of confidence tell us when a memory can be recalled and when a judgment was correct. Thus, they appear to be a form of metacognition, but a curious one: they tell us about content we cannot access, and the information is supplied by a feeling. Evaluativism is the claim that epistemic feelings are components of a distinct, primitive metacognitive mechanism that operates on its own set of inputs. These inputs are heuristics that correlate with the presence of mental content that can’t be accessed directly. I will argue that evaluativism is unmotivated, unsupported, and ill-conceived. I will critique the philosophical and empirical arguments for evaluativism and conclude that there is no reason to posit a distinct mechanism to explain epistemic feelings. I will conclude, however, that epistemic feelings may constitute a nonconceptual form of metacognition, which if true is a significant claim.

舌尖上的经验，认识和信心等认知性知识告诉我们何时可以回忆记忆和何时正确判断。因此，它们似乎是一种元认知形式，但是却是一种奇怪的形式：它们告诉我们我们无法访问的内容，而信息是通过一种感觉提供的。评价论认为，认知感觉是一种独特的原始元认知机制的组成部分，该机制基于自己的输入进行操作。这些输入是与无法直接访问的心理内容的存在相关的启发式方法。我将辩称，评估主义是没有动机，没有支持和构想不当的。我将对评价论的哲学和经验论据进行批判，并得出结论，没有理由提出一种独特的机制来解释认知感觉。