In this paper, I synthesize recent work in the philosophy of action to propose an analytic reconstruction of the concept of habit. My main point is that habit (or habitus) can be a central, not just supplemental or auxiliary concept in action theory and the explanation of action. To show this, I systematically analyze the way habits can be used as a resource to explain action while comparing the way habits explain action with the standard way we explain action as being caused by the interplay of beliefs, desires, and intentions. I point to the specific “historical” way that habits can be seen as causes of action and show that the conceptual commitments of habit-based explanations are both more substantial and more robust than intention-based explanations. Once formed, habits act as inclinations and dispositions, being reliably triggered in the requisite context by the appropriate circumstances. Finally, I analyze the core concept of automaticity as applied to habit. I argue that since automaticity is not a unitary concept, different features of automaticity are more central to habit than others, allowing us to differentiate the most representative members of the habit category from more peripheral members.

中文翻译：

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习惯和行动的解释

在这篇论文中，我综合了最近在行动哲学方面的工作，以提出对习惯概念的分析重建。我的主要观点是习惯（或惯习）可以是行动理论和行动解释中的核心概念，而不仅仅是补充或辅助概念。为了证明这一点，我系统地分析了习惯可以作为资源的方式解释行为，同时比较习惯解释行为的方式与我们将行为解释为由信念、欲望和意图的相互作用引起的标准方式。我指出了习惯可以被视为行动原因的特定“历史”方式，并表明基于习惯的解释的概念承诺比基于意图的解释更实质性和更稳健。习惯一旦形成，就会成为倾向和性格，在必要的环境中由适当的环境可靠地触发。最后，我分析了应用于习惯的自动性的核心概念。我认为由于自动性不是一个单一的概念，自动性的不同特征比其他特征对习惯更重要，