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The End of European Security Institutions? The EU's Common Foreign Security Policy and NATO after Brexit, by B. Zyla (Cham: Springer, 2020, ISBN 9783030421601); xi+102pp., €51.99 pb./€42.79 e‐book.
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies ( IF 2.500 ) Pub Date : 2021-03-09 , DOI: 10.1111/jcms.13149
James Sperling 1
Affiliation  

The impact of Brexit on NATO will – barring the dissolution of the UK – have no significant operational consequence for the alliance. British forces will continue to function within NATO as they did before and after its accession to the EEC in 1973. But Brexit will deprive the EU of significant military capabilities. The UK contributes 20 per cent of the capabilities in the EU force catalogue, it possesses at least 50 per cent of European nuclear attack submarines and heavy Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) unmanned aerial vehicles and over 40 per cent of airborne early warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft and heavy transport aircraft. What is often left unremarked is that those capabilities are also at a very high degree of readiness and the UK is ready to use them across the entire spectrum of conflict.

European efforts to aggregate military capabilities have yielded meagre results and this is not likely to change after Brexit. The necessity of effective small‐n military cooperation within the EU was undermined when Germany insisted that participation in permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) be opened to any EU member‐state. PECSO's consequent limitations, in conjunction with Brexit, led France to propose the European intervention initiative (EI2) outside the EU. The EI2 not only brings together a cohesive and capable set of states with respect to military capabilities and ambitions but facilitates British participation in European military operations. Natalie Tocci's claim that Britain's absence from the common security and defence policy (CSDP) will enhance the EU's future ability to institutionalize military cooperation is undoubtedly correct. But it is also true that the loss of British capabilities will foreclose progress towards meaningful strategic autonomy. There is nothing to prevent British participation in a future EU‐led ad hoc military coalition; after all, most CSDP (and NATO) missions have been ad hoc coalitions in practice.

Brexit does not herald the end of European security institutions, although it may shift the institutional balance of power further in NATO's favour. Benjamin Zyla puts forward two unassailable arguments: the EU should seek to ensure future British defence and security cooperation towards maintaining Europe's ability to act; and Brexit is likely to guarantee NATO's institutional and operational dominance on matters touching upon European security.

This book is designed as a supplementary text for courses on European security. The introduction and conclusion bookend two substantive chapters devoted to the historical evolution of the UK's relationship to NATO and the EU, followed by two chapters assessing the impact of Brexit on both institutions. The chapter on Brexit's impact on NATO focuses on strategic challenges facing NATO that are systemic and peripheral to the central issue of the direct and indirect impacts of Brexit on the alliance. The real value‐added of this analysis is found in the penultimate chapter on Brexit and the EU. Here, Zyla demonstrates in detail how Brexit will diminish the EU's operational capabilities, future cooperation on future defence systems and diplomatic heft outside Europe.

It is unfortunate that the copy‐editor fell asleep at the wheel. There seems to be at least one error on every page of the book (particularly in the footnotes). The most egregious errors include the identification of Lawrence Kaplan as Robert Kaplan (p. 30) and George Robertson as Lloyd Robertson (p. 60), and an inability to decide whether the correct abbreviation for the European intervention initiative is E2I or EI2 (pp. 94 and 95). These and other errors marred an otherwise basic and useful introduction to the security implications of Brexit.



中文翻译:

欧洲安全机构的终结?齐拉(B.Zyla),《欧盟共同对外安全政策和英国退欧后的北约》(湛:斯普林格,2020年,ISBN 9783030421601); xi + 102pp。,€51.99磅/€42.79电子书。

除非英国解散,否则英国退欧对北约的影响将对该联盟没有重大的运营后果。英国军队将继续在北约内部如1973年加入欧洲经济共同体之前和之后一样运作。但是,英国退欧将使欧盟丧失重要的军事能力。英国贡献了欧盟部队目录中20%的能力,拥有至少50%的欧洲核攻击潜艇和重型科学与工业研究理事会(CSIR)无人驾驶飞机,以及40%以上的机载预警和控制系统(AWACS)飞机和重型运输飞机。通常没有提及的是,这些能力也处于高度准备就绪状态,英国已准备好在整个冲突范围内使用它们。

欧洲为增强军事实力所做的努力仅取得了微不足道的结果,英国退欧后这种情况不太可能改变。当德国坚持要求向任何欧盟成员国开放参与永久性结构化合作(PESCO)时,破坏了欧盟内部有效的小型n军事合作的必要性。PECSO随之而来的局限性,加上英国脱欧,促使法国提出了在欧盟之外的欧洲干预倡议(EI2)。EI2不仅在军事能力和野心方面凝聚了一批有凝聚力和能力的国家,而且还促进了英国参与欧洲军事行动。娜塔莉·托奇(Natalie Tocci)声称,英国退出共同的安全与防务政策(CSDP)将增强欧盟的实力。未来军事合作制度化的能力无疑是正确的。但是,英国能力的丧失也将阻止实现有意义的战略自治的进展。没有什么可以阻止英国参加由欧盟领导的未来特设军事联盟。毕竟,大多数CSDP(和北约)特派团实际上都是特设联盟。

英国脱欧并没有预示着欧洲安全机构的终结,尽管这可能会进一步推动北约的体制力量平衡。本杰明·齐拉(Benjamin Zyla)提出了两个无懈可击的论点:欧盟应寻求确保英国未来的国防和安全合作,以维持欧洲的行动能力。英国脱欧很可能会保证北约在涉及欧洲安全的事务上在体制和运作上占主导地位。

本书旨在作为欧洲安全课程的补充教科书。引言和结论书结束了两个实质性章节,专门论述了英国与北约和欧盟关系的历史演变,其后两章评估了英国退欧对这两个机构的影响。关于英国退欧对北约的影响的一章重点讨论了北约面临的战略挑战,这些挑战是英国退欧对联盟的直接和间接影响这一中心问题的系统性和外围性。这项分析的真正增值可在关于英国退欧和欧盟的倒数第二章中找到。兹拉(Zyla)在这里详细展示了英国退欧将如何削弱欧盟的作战能力,未来在未来国防系统上的合作以及欧洲以外的外交势力。

不幸的是,复制编辑器在方向盘上睡着了。本书的每一页似乎都存在至少一个错误(尤其是在脚注中)。最令人震惊的错误包括:将劳伦斯·卡普兰(Lawrence Kaplan)识别为罗伯特·卡普兰(Robert Kaplan)(第30页),将乔治·罗伯逊(George Robertson)识别为劳埃德·罗伯逊(Lloyd Robertson)(第60页),以及无法确定欧洲干预措施的正确缩写是E2I还是EI2(pp 94和95)。这些错误和其他错误破坏了英国退欧安全含义的其他基本和有用的介绍。

更新日期:2021-03-10
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