Common resource dilemmas (CRDs) and public good dilemmas (PGDs) are distinct types of social dilemmas, yet they model the same underlying conflict between the collective interest and one's self-interest. Here, we study and interpret behavioral differences between these two main types of social dilemmas by applying a logic of appropriateness. In two experiments, we argue and demonstrate that CRDs, relative to PGDs, evoke higher levels of cooperation, because taking from collective property (in CRDs) is generally considered less appropriate than not giving from personal property (in PGDs). Importantly, these differential considerations of appropriateness are reflected not only in the willingness to cooperate but also in the willingness to punish and reward others' (non)cooperative behavior. Taken together, the findings reveal that CRDs and PGDs elicit different norms of appropriateness.

中文翻译：

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应用适当性逻辑来理解常见资源困境和公共产品困境之间的行为差​​异

共同资源困境 (CRD) 和公共物品困境 (PGD) 是不同类型的社会困境，但它们模拟了集体利益和个人利益之间相同的潜在冲突。在这里，我们通过应用适当的逻辑来研究和解释这两种主要类型的社会困境之间的行为差​​异。在两个实验中，我们论证并证明，相对于 PGDs，CRDs 唤起了更高水平的合作，因为从集体财产中获取（在 CRDs 中）通常被认为比不从个人财产中给予（在 PGDs 中）更不合适。重要的是，这些对适当性的不同考虑不仅反映在合作意愿上，还反映在惩罚和奖励他人（非）合作行为的意愿上。综合起来，