Designers of smart environments based on radio frequency identification devices have a challenging task to build secure mutual authentication protocols. These systems are classified into two major factions which are traditional closed-loop systems, and open-loop systems. To the best of our knowledge, all of the mutual authentication protocols previously introduced for these two categories rely on a centralized database but they fail to address decentralized mutual authentication and their related attacks. Thanks to the blockchain technology, which is a novel distributed technology, in this paper, we propose two decentralized mutual authentication protocols for IoT systems. Our first scheme is utilized for traditional closed-loop RFID systems (called CLAB), and the second one applies to open-loop RFID systems (called OLAB). Meanwhile, we examine the security of the Chebyshev chaotic map-based authentication algorithm and confirm that this algorithm is unprotected against tag and reader impersonation attacks. Likewise, we present a denial of service (DoS), tag impersonation, and reader impersonation attacks against the Chebyshev chaotic-map based protocol when employed in open-loop IoT networks. Moreover, we discover a full secret recovery attack against a recent RFID mutual authentication protocol which is based on blockchain. Finally, we use the BAN-logic method to approve the security characteristics of our CLAB and OLAB proposals.

基于射频识别设备的智能环境的设计人员具有建立安全的相互身份验证协议的艰巨任务。这些系统分为两个主要部分，即传统的闭环系统和开环系统。据我们所知，先前针对这两种类别引入的所有相互身份验证协议都依赖于集中式数据库，但它们无法解决分散的相互身份验证及其相关攻击。由于采用了一种新颖的分布式技术-区块链技术，我们提出了两种用于物联网系统的去中心化相互认证协议。我们的第一个方案用于传统的闭环RFID系统（称为CLAB），第二个适用于开环RFID系统（称为OLAB）。同时，我们检查了基于Chebyshev混沌地图的身份验证算法的安全性，并确认该算法没有受到标签和读取器假冒攻击的保护。同样，当在开环物联网网络中使用基于Chebyshev混沌映射的协议时，我们会提出拒绝服务（DoS），标签模拟和读取器模拟攻击。此外，我们发现了针对基于区块链的最新RFID相互认证协议的完全秘密恢复攻击。最后，我们使用BAN逻辑方法来批准CLAB和OLAB建议的安全性特征。