L. A. Paul’s Transformative Experience makes the claim that many important life decisions are epistemically and personally transformative in a way that does not allow us to assign subjective values to their outcomes. As a result, we cannot use normative decision theory to make such decisions rationally, or when we modify it to do so, decision theory leads us to choose in a way that is in tension with our authenticity. This paper examines Paul’s version of decision theory, and whether this version in fact admits of the challenge she wants to raise. I focus on her psychological realist view of utilities and beliefs and her notion of rational, authentic preferences as informed by imaginative acquaintance. I argue that Paul fails to engage critically with traditional accounts of decision theory and, on closer inspection, it is not clear that her version of decision theory entails a tension between rational and authentic choice. More importantly, I argue that if her contribution is instead to bring to light the importance of authenticity alongside rational decision-making, the definition she provides of authenticity in fact undermines her argument.

保罗的变革经历宣称许多重要的人生决定是认识论上和个人上的变革，其方式不允许我们将主观价值分配给他们的结果。结果，我们不能使用规范决策理论来合理地做出此类决策，或者当我们对其进行修改时，决策理论会导致我们以与真实性相抵触的方式进行选择。本文研究了保罗的决策理论版本，以及该版本实际上是否承认她想提出的挑战。我专注于她的实用主义和信念的心理学现实主义观点，以及通过富有想象力的相识而得到的理性，真实偏好的观念。我认为保罗无法批判性地参与决策理论的传统论述，并且经过仔细检查，尚不清楚她的决策理论版本在理性选择与真实选择之间是否存在张力。更重要的是，我认为，如果她的贡献是要揭示真实性与理性决策之间的重要性，那么她对真实性的定义实际上会破坏她的论点。