This review essay discusses Giambattista Vico and the New Psychological Science, which contains seven essays that challenge traditional anthropological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions that define psychology as a social science and instead interpret it as an embodied understanding of human cultural activity. The authors use Vico's New Science to support this endeavor because, they suggest, it traces the creation of human existence from a prehuman animal state with the agency of poiesis, an embodied meta‐phoric language and social practices that are inseparable from that language. This effort is a potentially transformative reinterpretation of Vico, whose verum factum principle scholars interpret as challenging Cartesian epistemology. Identifying the true with the made, Vico's principle limits human knowing to what humans make—that is, their historical world. The authors rightly emphasize the embodied nature of making with poetic language and social practices. However, they undermine the significance of that embodiment by assuming that knowing what is made with poiesis is, like traditional understandings of knowledge, epistemic. Thus, they implicitly retain humanism's metaphysical assumption that grounds epistemology: humans know intelligible reality because they are dualistic beings who possess rational, subjective natures. By contrast, I claim that Vico's poetic humanism is a more radical move from traditional humanism's belief in epistemology toward a culturally active anthropology. For Vico, bodily skills of perception, memory, and imagination create a metaphoric language based on random perceptions, images, and sounds. This metaphoric language is inseparable from social practices and physical skills, creating a meaningful human world. The making achieved by embodied poetic language cannot lead to epistemic knowledge; it can only lead to the self‐referential hermeneutic understanding that humans are the creators of their human existence. Vico's verum factum is not an epistemological principle in the Cartesian tradition but an ontological unity of knowing and making through sociophysical skills that are inseparable from poetic language. Humans make their ontologically real, meaningful human world and know themselves as its creators.

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VICO的新科学和新的诗意心理学

这篇评论文章讨论了Giambattista Vico和新心理学科学，其中包含七篇挑战传统人类学，认识论和方法论假设的论文，这些假设将心理学定义为社会科学，而将其解释为对人类文化活动的具体理解。作者使用维科的《新科学》来支持这项工作，因为他们认为，这追溯了人类在人类前动物状态下与poiesis机构的联系，poiesis是一种隐喻性隐喻语言，而与该语言密不可分的社会实践也是如此。这项工作是对Vico的潜在变革性重新诠释，其Vium事实原理学者将其解释为具有挑战性的笛卡尔认识论。Vico的原理通过制造来鉴定真相，将人类的了解限制在人类制造的东西上，即他们的历史世界。作者正确地强调了用诗歌语言和社会实践进行创作的本质。但是，它们通过假设知道像传统的知​​识认识一样，用poiesis进行了认知，从而破坏了该实施例的重要性。因此，他们隐含地保留了以人类认识论为基础的人本主义形而上学的假设：人类之所以能够理解现实，是因为他们是具有理性，主观本性的二元论者。相比之下，我认为维科的诗意人文主义是从传统人本主义对认识论的信仰向文化上活跃的人类学的更彻底的转变。对于维科 感知，记忆和想象力的身体技能会基于随机的感知，图像和声音创建一种隐喻语言。这种隐喻性语言与社会实践和身体技能密不可分，创造了一个有意义的人类世界。体现诗意的语言所取得的成就不能导致认识知识的产生。它只能导致对人类是人类生存的创造者的自我参照的诠释学理解。维科的 它只能导致对人类是人类生存的创造者的自我参照的诠释学理解。维科的 它只能导致对人类是人类生存的创造者的自我参照的诠释学理解。维科的事实事实不是笛卡尔传统的认识论原则，而是通过与诗语语言密不可分的社会物理技能来认识和创造的本体论统一体。人类使他们的本体论成为现实的，有意义的人类世界，并且知道自己是其创造者。