Optimally reallocating human capital to tasks is key for an organization to successfully navigate a transition. We study how to design employment contracts to allocate employees to different valuable projects within an organization given two simultaneous challenges: The employees have private information about their cost of effort, and they exert unobservable effort. The optimal contract menu pairs a higher probability of assignment to a valuable project with a lower bonus in case of success. In limited cases, a fixed salary may be offered to employees with high effort cost. We link our results to job design features encountered in practice.

中文翻译：

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人才管理：最佳合同的甄选和激励

将人力资本最佳地重新分配给任务是组织成功应对过渡的关键。我们研究了如何设计雇佣合同，以将员工分配到组织中的不同有价值的项目，同时面临两个挑战：员工拥有有关其工作成本的私人信息，并且他们付出了不可观察的努力。最佳合同菜单将成功分配给有价值的项目的可能性较高，而奖金则较低。在极少数情况下，可能会以高昂的努力成本为员工提供固定薪水。我们将结果链接到实践中遇到的工作设计功能。