This article examines the nature of affective states across biological taxa. It argues that affect constitutes a primary form of consciousness. Creatures capable of affect are sentient of their bodily states and can behave in ways intended to maintain or restore them to a homeostatic range. After reviewing and critiquing neurobiological and philosophical theories of the evolution of consciousness, this article argues that some possible creatures are limited to self-directed affective states, even if those creatures are capable of exteroception. Such creatures enjoy solipsistic sentience: awareness of their own selves and bodily demands, but unawareness of their exogenous environments.

中文翻译：

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唯我论

本文研究了跨生物分类群的情感状态的性质。它认为情感构成了意识的主要形式。能够影响的生物对它们的身体状态有感知，并且可以以旨在维持或恢复它们的稳态范围的方式行事。在回顾和批判了意识进化的神经生物学和哲学理论之后，本文认为一些可能的生物仅限于自我导向的情感状态，即使这些生物能够进行外感。这样的生物享受唯我论的感觉：意识到自己和身体的需求，但不知道他们的外在环境。