Do the benefits of central bank transparency depend on the structure of financial markets? We address this question in a two-country model with dispersed information among price-setting firms. The volatility of the real exchange rate is non-monotonic in the precision of public communications. Despite this non-monotonicity, under complete markets, greater provision of public information always improves welfare and full transparency is optimal. By contrast, under incomplete markets, more accurate public signals can decrease welfare by exacerbating the cost of cross-country demand imbalances. If the trade elasticity is low, optimal public announcements are intentionally imprecise.

中央银行透明化的好处是否取决于金融市场的结构？我们在两个国家的模型中解决了这个问题，这些模型的信息分散在价格制定公司之间。实际汇率的波动性在公共通信的精度上不是单调的。尽管存在这种非单调性，但在完整的市场中，提供更多的公共信息总是可以改善福利，并且完全透明是最佳的。相比之下，在市场不完整的情况下，更准确的公共信号会通过加剧跨国需求失衡的成本来降低福利。如果贸易弹性低，则最佳公开公告是故意不精确的。