We argue that the attempt to build morality into machines is subject to what we call the Interpretation problem, whereby any rule we give the machine is open to infinite interpretation in ways that we might morally disapprove of, and that the interpretation problem in Artificial Intelligence is an illustration of Wittgenstein's general claim that no rule can contain the criteria for its own application. Using games as an example, we attempt to define the structure of normative spaces and argue that any rule-following within a normative space is guided by values that are external to that space and which cannot themselves be represented as rules. In light of this problem, we analyse the types of mistakes an artificial moral agent could make and we make suggestions about how to build morality into machines by getting them to interpret the rules we give in accordance with these external values, through explicit moral reasoning and the presence of structured values, the adjustment of causal power assigned to the agent and interaction with human agents, such that the machine develops a virtuous character and the impact of the interpretation problem is minimised.

中文翻译：

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道德，机器和解释问题：维特根斯坦基于价值的方法来构建道德主体

我们认为，将道德纳入机器的尝试受制于我们所谓的解释问题，即我们赋予机器的任何规则都可能受到我们可能在道德上不赞成的方式进行无限解释，而人工智能中的解释问题是维特根斯坦（Wittgenstein）的一般主张的例证，即任何规则都不能包含其适用标准。以游戏为例，我们试图定义规范空间的结构，并认为规范空间内的任何规则遵循都遵循该空间外部的值，而这些值本身不能表示为规则。鉴于这个问题，