To investigate the impact of culture on the acceptance and prevalence of sanctioning institutions, we report the results of controlled lab experiments in two countries with substantial cultural differences: Germany and Turkey. We find, if a sanctioning institution is one of two alternatives that individuals can freely choose in an endogenous setting, then it is the clear winner against a non-sanctioning institution, both in Germany and Turkey. Though there are some differences in initial institutional preferences and contributions in both countries, the dynamics of institution choice, the evolution of contributions and sanctioning behavior are remarkably similar. Our results extend the findings of a previous study by Herrmann, Thöni, and Gächter (2008) that finds less cooperative behaviors in some countries (among them Turkey) if the sanctioning institutions are exogenous. We show that in one of those countries, Turkey, in an endogenous setting, sanctioning institutions beneficial to societies are adapted and prevail.

为了调查文化对制裁机构的接受和普及的影响，我们报告了两个文化差异很大的国家（德国和土耳其）进行的受控实验室实验的结果。我们发现，如果制裁机构是个人可以在内生的自由选择中选择的两种选择之一在德国和土耳其，这无疑是反对非制裁机构的明显赢家。尽管两国在最初的制度偏好和捐款方面存在一些差异，但制度选择的动态，捐款的演变和制裁行为都极为相似。我们的结果扩展了Herrmann，Thöni和Gächter（2008）先前研究的结果，该研究发现，如果制裁机构是外生的，则在某些国家（其中包括土耳其）的合作行为较少。我们表明，在这些国家之一的土耳其内生化的环境中，对社会有益的制裁机构已经适应并盛行。