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An epistemic modal norm of practical reasoning
Synthese ( IF 1.5 ) Pub Date : 2021-03-05 , DOI: 10.1007/s11229-021-03086-8
Tim Henning

When are you in a position to rely on p in practical reasoning? Existing accounts say that you must know that p, or be in a position to know that p, or be justified in believing that p, or be in a position to justifiably believe it, and so on. This paper argues that all of these proposals face important problems, which I call the Problems of Negative Bootstrapping and of Level Confusions. I offer a diagnosis of these problems, and I argue that an adequate epistemic norm must be transparent in the following sense: According to any transparent epistemic norm, a consideration counts in favor of (or against) relying on p in practical reasoning for action iff, and to the extent that, this consideration also counts in favor of (or against) p being true. I introduce a candidate epistemic norm that satisfies this condition. According to this norm, one should rely on p in practical reasoning only if it must be that p. I show that if we adopt a non-factualist account of “must”, this amounts to a novel and attractive proposal, a proposal that satisfies the transparency condition.



中文翻译:

实践推理的认知模态规范

您什么时候可以在实践推理中依靠p?现有帐户说您必须知道p,或者必须知道p,或者有理由相信p,或者有理由相信它,依此类推。本文认为所有这些提议都面临着重要的问题,我称之为负自举和水平混淆问题。我对这些问题提供了诊断,并且我认为适当的认知规范必须在以下意义上透明:根据任何透明的认知规范,考虑都支持(或反对)依赖p在采取行动的实际推理中,并且在某种程度上,这种考虑也意味着赞成(或反对)p为真。我介绍了满足此条件的候选认知规范。根据这个标准,应该依靠p在实践推理,只有当它必须是p。我表明,如果我们采用非强制性的“必须”说明,那就等于是一种新颖而诱人的提案,该提案满足了透明性条件。

更新日期:2021-03-05
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