Firms in the same networks tend to have similar corporate governance practices. However, disentangling peer effects, where governance practices propagate from one firm to another, from selection effects, where firms with similar preferences self-select into linked groups, is difficult to do. Studying board-interlocked firms, we utilize the staggered adoption of universal demand laws across states to identify and estimate causal peer effects in governance policies. We find support for the existence of peer effects in the adoption of antitakeover provisions. The impact of universal demand laws on the governance experience of interlocking directors likely explains these effects.

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公司治理实践中的同行效应：来自普遍需求法的证据

同一网络中的公司往往具有相似的公司治理实践。然而，很难将治理实践从一家公司传播到另一家公司的同行效应与选择效应（具有相似偏好的公司自我选择到相关群体中）分开。通过研究董事会联锁公司，我们利用各州交错采用的普遍需求法来识别和估计治理政策中的因果同行效应。我们发现在采用反收购条款时存在对等效应的支持。普遍需求法对联锁董事治理经验的影响可能解释了这些影响。