Farmers make livelihood and landholding decisions within institutional contexts that deliver and shape access to resources they need. I develop an ‘institutional-benefit-pathway framework’ to help explain the politics of resource distribution and how farmers access resources that support their livelihoods, such as seeds, farmland improvement technology, and microcredit. Based on qualitative evidence collected over 16 months of fieldwork among 212 smallholder households and 60+ civic, state, and market institutions in Telangana, India, this paper identifies three pathways: a state pathway illustrated by a millet promotion initiative; a state-civic society pathway highlighted by watershed management; and a state-civic society-market pathway that delivers climate information and microcredit, while promoting pesticide-free agricultural practice. Benefit pathway analysis reveals the institutional rules and roles that demarcate direction and access to benefits by illustrating the complexities of local institutional interaction and the roles of institutional power in access to resources. The cases show that state and NGO actors hold disproportionate influence over resource distribution, while smallholders are largely unable to influence the development policy process. Smallholders are, in this context, unable to correct the unevenness in benefit distribution, and affect the type of benefits, which are all ironically meant for them. However, the cases also uncover mechanisms that farmers use to gain access to resources. Results suggest that mere partnership of state and non-state actors will not necessarily lead to better development outcomes and that institutionally mediated benefits are as vulnerable to capture from powerful institutions as they are from local elites. Through the cases, I argue that development assistance is more effective and equitable when farmers are able to influence the elements and distribution of benefits.

农民在机构环境中做出谋生和土地占有决定，以提供并塑造他们所需资源的获取途径。我开发了一个“机构－收益－途径框架”，以帮助解释资源分配的政治原理以及农民如何获取支持其生计的资源，例如种子，农田改良技术和小额信贷。根据印度特兰甘纳邦212个小农户和60多个公民，州和市场机构在16个月的田野调查中获得的定性证据，本文确定了三种途径：以小米促进倡议为例的国家途径；以流域管理为重点的国家公民社会路径；以及提供气候信息和小额信贷，同时促进无农药农业实践的州-公民社会-市场途径。利益路径分析通过说明地方机构互动的复杂性以及机构权力在获取资源中的作用，揭示了界定方向和获取利益的制度规则和角色。这些案例表明，国家和非政府组织行为者对资源分配的影响不成比例，而小农户在很大程度上不能影响发展政策进程。在这种情况下，小农无法纠正利益分配不均，并影响利益的类型，这对他们来说都是具有讽刺意味的。但是，这些案例还揭示了农民用来获取资源的机制。结果表明，仅由国家和非国家行为者组成的伙伴关系并不一定会带来更好的发展成果，而且制度介导的利益也很容易从强大的机构那里获得，就像从地方精英那里一样。通过这些案例，我认为，当农民能够影响收益的要素和分配时，发展援助将更加有效和公平。