Salience reasoning, many have argued, can help solve coordination problems, but only if such reasoning is supplemented by higher-order predictions, e.g. beliefs about what others believe yet others will choose. In this paper, I will argue that this line of reasoning is self-undermining. Higher-order behavioral predictions defeat salience-based behavioral predictions. To anchor my argument in the philosophical literature, I will develop it in response and opposition to the popular Lewisian model of salience reasoning in coordination games. This model imports the problematic higher-order beliefs by way of a ‘symmetric reasoning’ constraint. In the second part of this paper, I will argue that a player may employ salience reasoning only if she suspends judgment about what others believe yet others will do.

许多人认为，显着推理可以帮助解决协调问题，但前提是这种推理必须辅以更高阶的预测，例如对他人相信的信念，而他人也会选择。在本文中，我将论证这种推理是自我破坏的。高阶行为预测会击败基于显着性的行为预测。为了将我的论据锚定在哲学文献中，我将对协调游戏中流行的显着性推理的刘易斯模型做出回应和反对，以此来发展我的论点。该模型通过“对称推理”约束导入有问题的高阶信念。在本文的第二部分，我会说，一个球员可以采用显着性推理只有当她暂停别人怎么相信还有一些会做判断。