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What it Might Be like to Be a Group Agent
Neuroethics ( IF 1.4 ) Pub Date : 2021-03-02 , DOI: 10.1007/s12152-021-09459-7
Max F. Kramer

Many theorists have defended the claim that collective entities can attain genuine agential status. If collectives can be agents, this opens up a further question: can they be conscious? That is, is there something that it is like to be them? Eric Schwitzgebel (Philosophical Studies 172: 1697–1721, 2015) argues that yes, collective entities (including the United States, taken as a whole), may well be significantly conscious. Others, including Kammerer (Philosophia 43: 1047–1057, 2015), Tononi and Koch (Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 370: 20140167–20140167, 2015) , and List (Noûs 52: 295–319, 2018) reject the claim. List does so on the basis of Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (Encyclopedia of Consciousness, 403–416, 2009). I argue here that List’s rejection is too quick, and that groups can, at least in principle, display the kind of informational integration we might think is necessary for consciousness. However, group consciousness will likely differ substantially from the individual experiences that give rise to it. This requires the defender of group consciousness to face up to a similar combination problem as the panpsychist.



中文翻译:

成为集团代理商可能会是什么样子

许多理论家为集体实体可以取得真正代理地位的主张辩护。如果集体可以成为代理人,这将引发一个进一步的问题:他们可以自觉吗?也就是说,有什么想成为他们的东西吗?埃里克·施维茨伯格(Eric Sc​​hwitzgebel,哲学研究172:1697–1721,2015)认为,是的,集体实体(包括美国,作为一个整体)很可能具有明显的意识。其他,包括Kammerer(Philosophia 43:1047-1057,2015),Tononi和Koch(Royal Society的哲学交易B:Biological Sciences 370:20140167-20140167,2015)和List(Noûs52:295–319,2018)拒绝了该要求。利斯特基于托诺尼的意识综合信息理论(《意识百科全书》,403-416,2009年)来这样做。在这里,我认为List的拒绝太快了,并且至少在原则上,小组可以显示出我们可能认为对于意识而言必要的信息整合。但是,集体意识很可能与引起这种意识的个人经历大不相同。这要求群体意识的捍卫者面对与泛心理学家类似的组合问题。

更新日期:2021-03-03
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