similarities than prior generations of scholars did. Within the mass of information succinctly presented, Herzog develops one overarching theme. Everywhere law adapted to change, but almost always under the guise of preserving continuity—if not continuity as institutions changed shape, continuity in the concepts thought to justify the use of those institutions. What the law was at any time and place depended heavily on its context, although those who wrote and thought about their law regularly asserted—and may have believed—that they were describing a context-independent law. An important driver of change was pluralism, the encounter between those committed to one view of the law with communities holding different views of it. In retrospect, we can see dramatic differences between how law was understood in earlier centuries and how it became understood later (and today) after changes had accumulated, even though at nearly every moment, legal thought tended to insist that the law at that moment was little different from what it had been a while before. A single example drawn from Herzog’s rich account can sketch how she develops this theme. She contrasts the American and French revolutions: “[I]n the Thirteen Colonies, . . . most actors appealed to natural law yet also wished to continue upholding many traditions,” whereas in France, “the declared aim was to create a new order, where norms would no longer be inherited from the past. Instead they would herald a future in which all decisions . . . would be mandated by natural law and reason.” Although this vision “transformed the French Revolution into an earthquake that allowed for the emergence of law as we know it today,” the vision “was sometimes more radical than the actual legal changes” (183–184). The concept of “natural law” was used in the two locations, but it meant something different in each. Nonetheless, some degree of continuity was preserved even as revolutionaries announced that they were breaking sharply with the past. A work of this sort will inevitably make bold claims that studies of more discrete topics will qualify. It is written not for specialists who focus on one or another domain of substantive law in this or that nation and time but for general historians. Early in her or his training, every historian—no matter the specialty or period of study—would be well advised to step back and read through this superb work.

中文翻译：

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为了学习：为纪念安东尼·格拉夫顿而写的论文

与前几代学者的相似之处。在简短呈现的大量信息中，赫尔佐格提出了一个总体主题。各地的法律都适应变化，但几乎总是以维护连续性为幌子。如果制度变迁时，如果不是连续性，则认为概念的连续性可以证明使用那些制度是合理的。尽管在法律上写下并思考过的人经常断言并可能相信，他们在描述与上下文无关的法律，但在任何时间和地点，法律的内容在很大程度上取决于其上下文。变革的一个重要驱动力是多元化，即致力于一种法律观点的人与持有不同法律观点的社区之间的相遇。回想起来，我们可以看到，在过去的几个世纪中，人们对法律的理解方式与变化积累后的法律理解方式之间存在着巨大的差异，即使在几乎每时每刻，法律思想都倾向于认为当时的法律与当时的法律没有什么不同。之前已经有一段时间了。从赫尔佐格丰富的论述中得出的一个例子可以勾勒出她如何发展这一主题。她对比了美国和法国的革命：“ [13个殖民地，。。大多数参与者呼吁自然法，但也希望继续秉承许多传统，”而在法国，“宣称的目标是建立新的秩序，不再从过去继承规范。相反，他们将预示所有决定的未来。。。将由自然法和理性授权。“尽管这一愿景“将法国大革命转变为地震，使我们今天所知道的法律得以出现，”但该愿景“有时比实际的法律变化更为激进”（183-184）。两个地方使用了“自然法”的概念，但每个地方的含义有所不同。尽管如此，即使革命者宣布他们与过去的急剧突破一样，也保留了一定程度的连续性。此类作品将不可避免地大胆宣称对更多离散主题的研究将符合资格。它不是为在那个国家或那个时代专注于实体法的一个或另一个领域的专家而写的，而是为一般的历史学家而写的。在她或他的训练初期，