This Article argues that international investment agreements (IIAs) serve a dual economic function—to discipline host country policies that impose international externalities on foreign investors, and to curtail inefficient risks associated with agency costs, risk aversion, asymmetric information, and time inconsistency problems that uneconomically increase the cost of imported capital in host countries. It draws on the economic analysis to explain central features of IIAs and their evolution over time, and to address various controversial issues in international investment litigation.

中文翻译：

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国际投资协定的经济结构对条约解释和设计的影响

本文认为，国际投资协定 (IIA) 具有双重经济功能——约束东道国对外国投资者施加国际外部性的政策，并减少与代理成本、风险规避、信息不对称和时间不一致问题相关的低效风险不经济地增加东道国的进口资本成本。它利用经济分析来解释国际投资协定的核心特征及其随时间的演变，并解决国际投资诉讼中的各种有争议的问题。