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Board of directors and earnings management: conventional and Islamic banks
Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics ( IF 1.137 ) Pub Date : 2021-03-02 , DOI: 10.1080/16081625.2021.1886951
Ahmad Abu-Dawleh 1, 2 , Nadine Lybaert 3 , Tensie Steijvers 1 , Mieke Jans 4
Affiliation  

ABSTRACT

This study examines how the board of directors (BOD) of Islamic banks (IBs) might affect earnings management differently, compared to BOD of conventional banks (CBs). Our results indicate that banks in the MENA region that promote BOD independence incur less earnings management. Distinguishing between CBs and IBs, we document higher loan quality and credit policy at IBs. Moreover, smaller BOD size and board independence decrease earnings management at IBs. Findings suggest that agency theory might not accommodate the agency conflicts at IBs, since it neglects stakeholders’ behavioural patterns. Thus, these results suggest the need to shape directors’ financial acumen at IBs.



中文翻译:

董事会和盈余管理:传统银行和伊斯兰银行

摘要

本研究探讨了与传统银行 (CB) 的董事会 (BOD) 相比,伊斯兰银行 (IB) 的董事会 (BOD) 如何影响盈余管理。我们的研究结果表明,促进董事会独立性的中东和北非地区银行的盈余管理较少。为了区分 CB 和 IB,我们记录了 IB 更高的贷款质量和信贷政策。此外,较小的董事会规模和董事会独立性降低了 IB 的盈余管理。研究结果表明,代理理论可能无法适应 IB 的代理冲突,因为它忽略了利益相关者的行为模式。因此,这些结果表明需要塑造 IB 董事的财务敏锐度。

更新日期:2021-03-02
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