We study price personalization in a two period duopoly with vertically differentiated products. In the second period, a firm not only knows the purchase history of all customers, as in standard Behavior Based Price Discrimination models, but it also collects detailed information on its old customers, using it to engage in price personalization. The analysis reveals that there exists a natural market for each firm, defined as the set of customers that cannot be poached by the rival in the second period. The equilibrium is unique, except when firms are ex-ante almost identical. In equilibrium, only the firm with the largest natural market poaches customers from the rival. This firm has highest profits but not necessarily the largest market share. Aggregate profits are lower than under uniform pricing. All consumers gain, total welfare is higher herein than under uniform pricing if firms’ natural markets are sufficiently asymmetric. The low quality firm chooses the minimal quality level and a quality differential arises, though the exact choice for the high quality depends upon the cost specification.

我们研究了具有垂直差异化产品的两个双头垄断时期的价格个性化。在第二阶段，一家公司不仅了解所有客户的购买历史（如基于行为的标准价格歧视模型一样），而且还收集有关其老客户的详细信息，并利用该信息进行价格个性化。分析表明，每个公司都有一个自然市场，定义为第二阶段竞争对手无法挖走的客户群。均衡是唯一的，除非企业事前几乎相同。在平衡状态下，只有拥有最大自然市场的公司才能从竞争对手那里骗取客户。该公司的利润最高，但不一定是最大的市场份额。总利润低于统一定价下的利润。如果公司的自然市场足够不对称，则所有消费者都将获得的总福利高于统一定价下的总福利。低质量的公司选择最低质量级别，但会出现质量差异，尽管对高质量的确切选择取决于成本规格。