This paper investigates the impact of the subsidy and horizontal strategic cooperation on a green supply chain where two competing manufacturers distribute substitutable green products through exclusive retailers. Models are formulated in three-stage game structures in five different scenarios, where the government organization determines optimal subsidy by pursuing social welfare maximization. Both manufacturers invest in improving green quality levels of products. The study aims to explore the advantage of vertical integration and strategic collusion from the perspective of green supply chain practice in the presence of subsidy. The key contributions from the present study indicate that under competition, members of both supply chains are able to receive higher profits through horizontal collusion, but green quality levels of the product remain suboptimal. If upstream manufacturers cooperate, government subsidy does not necessarily improve product quality level, and the amount of government expenditure increased substantially. By comparing outcomes where members are vertically integrated with scenarios where members make strategic collusion, we found that the former might outperform by later. Cross-price sensitivity appears as a significant parameter affecting supply chain members’ performance and the amount of government expenditure. Cooperation between members at the horizontal level is a more robust strategic measure than vertical integration if consumers are highly price-sensitive.

中文翻译：

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竞争中最优补贴率和供应链成员的战略行为对绿色产品零售的影响

本文研究了补贴和横向战略合作对绿色供应链的影响，在该供应链中，两个相互竞争的制造商通过独家零售商分销可替代的绿色产品。在五个不同的场景中，模型由三阶段博弈结构制定，其中政府组织通过追求社会福利最大化来确定最佳补贴。两家制造商都在投资以提高产品的绿色质量水平。该研究旨在从存在补贴的绿色供应链实践的角度探讨垂直整合和战略合谋的优势。本研究的主要贡献表明，在竞争下，两个供应链的成员都可以通过横向合谋获得更高的利润，但是产品的绿色质量等级仍然不理想。如果上游制造商合作，政府补贴并不一定会提高产品质量水平，政府支出额也会大大增加。通过将成员纵向整合的结果与成员进行战略合谋的情况进行比较，我们发现前者在稍后可能会跑赢大盘。交叉价格敏感性似乎是影响供应链成员绩效和政府支出金额的重要参数。如果消费者对价格高度敏感，则横向成员之间的合作是比纵向整合更为有效的战略措施。政府支出大幅度增加。通过将成员纵向整合的结果与成员进行战略合谋的情况进行比较，我们发现前者在稍后可能会跑赢大盘。交叉价格敏感性似乎是影响供应链成员绩效和政府支出金额的重要参数。如果消费者对价格高度敏感，则横向成员之间的合作是比纵向整合更为有效的战略措施。政府支出大幅度增加。通过将成员纵向整合的结果与成员进行战略合谋的情况进行比较，我们发现前者在稍后可能会跑赢大盘。交叉价格敏感性似乎是影响供应链成员绩效和政府支出金额的重要参数。如果消费者对价格高度敏感，则横向成员之间的合作是比纵向整合更为有效的战略措施。交叉价格敏感性似乎是影响供应链成员绩效和政府支出金额的重要参数。如果消费者对价格高度敏感，则横向成员之间的合作是比纵向整合更为有效的战略措施。交叉价格敏感性似乎是影响供应链成员绩效和政府支出金额的重要参数。如果消费者对价格高度敏感，则横向成员之间的合作是比纵向整合更为有效的战略措施。