On 28 September 2018, an earthquake and tsunami hit West Sulawesi, destroying homes, mosques and livelihoods, displacing 80,000 people and killing at least 2000. Immediately, thousands of volunteers mobilized to offer rescue and relief by providing food, organizing shelter and raising money and relief items through social networks and social media (Morse 2018b). These immediate, spontaneous and localized relief efforts preceded, complemented and partly substituted the more bureaucratic and coordinated response of local authorities (Morse 2018a), as well as interventions by specialized international organizations and large NGOs. While the Indonesian government at first declined international aid on the grounds that it could manage the disaster on its own, it accepted offers of relief assistance after the scale of the destruction became evident – albeit selectively and strictly regulating the nature of operations, provision of necessities and deployment of foreign personnel (ABC News 2018; Latiff and Kapoor 2018; Loy 2018a). Obviously, as Christina Bennett, an international aid policy analyst, notes, ‘gone are the days when you’re going to have a humanitarian sector that comes into a disaster situation with a very heavy footprint and sets up as almost an auxiliary, or a replacement of government services’ (quoted in Loy 2018b). While there has been speculation about the politics of Indonesia’s insistence on being able to help its own citizens, its response actually fits well within a broader trend towards the localization of aid, and the increasing prominence of new actors in the quest to provide relief to, and improve the lives of, people in need (e.g. Charter4Change 2018; Fejerskov, Lundsgaarde, and Cold-Ravnkilde 2017). In the context of the so-called afterlives of development (Rudnyckyj and Schwittay 2014), attempts to provide relief in times of disaster and to better the lives of (marginal) populations are now increasingly relocated to initiatives beyond the state and beyond the ‘traditional’ development expertise of established international organizations. This special issue focuses on the new assemblage of humanitarian and development actors in South East Asia. It analyses how social entrepreneurs, diaspora groups, religious charities, local self-help groups and private investors are involved in initiatives aimed at overcoming poverty, modernizing infrastructure, providing housing, expanding knowledge, organizing emergency relief and addressing social needs. Our contributions focus on the moral politics behind these on-the-ground assemblages of actors and practices. We ask, which tools, technologies and operative logics do these development actors employ? What are their goals and motivations? What claims do they make? How do their interventions play out in local life

中文翻译：

---

超越国家？东南亚发展的道德转向

2018 年 9 月 28 日，一场地震和海啸袭击了西苏拉威西岛，摧毁了房屋、清真寺和生计，导致 80,000 人流离失所，至少 2000 人死亡。立即，数千名志愿者动员起来，通过提供食物、组织住所和筹集资金和通过社交网络和社交媒体提供救济物品（Morse 2018b）。这些直接、自发和本地化的救援工作先于、补充并部分取代了地方当局更加官僚和协调的反应（Morse 2018a），以及专业国际组织和大型非政府组织的干预。虽然印尼政府起初以自己可以应对灾难为由拒绝了国际援助，在破坏的规模变得明显之后，它接受了救济援助的提议——尽管有选择地和严格地规范了行动的性质、必需品的提供和外国人员的部署（ABC News 2018；Latiff 和 Kapoor 2018；Loy 2018a）。显然，正如国际援助政策分析师克里斯蒂娜·贝内特 (Christina Bennett) 所指出的那样，“当人道主义部门陷入灾难时，其足迹非常大，几乎成为辅助或辅助机构的日子已经一去不复返了。替代政府服务”（引用自 Loy 2018b）。虽然有人猜测印度尼西亚坚持能够帮助本国公民的政治因素，但它的反应实际上非常符合援助本地化的更广泛趋势，以及寻求为有需要的人提供救济和改善他们的生活的新参与者的日益突出（例如，Charter4Change 2018；Fejerskov、Lundsgaarde 和 Cold-Ravnkilde 2017）。在所谓的发展后生活（Rudnyckyj 和 Schwittay 2014）的背景下，在灾难时期提供救济和改善（边缘）人口生活的尝试现在越来越多地转移到国家之外和“传统”之外的举措。 ' 已建立的国际组织的发展专业知识。本期特刊关注东南亚人道主义和发展行动者的新组合。它分析了社会企业家、侨民团体、宗教慈善机构、当地自助团体和私人投资者如何参与旨在消除贫困、实现基础设施现代化、提供住房、扩大知识、组织紧急救援和解决社会需求。我们的贡献集中在这些行动者和实践的实地组合背后的道德政治。我们问，这些开发参与者使用了哪些工具、技术和操作逻辑？他们的目标和动机是什么？他们提出什么主张？他们的干预如何在当地生活中发挥作用