This paper examines the monitoring role of investors in the behavioral spillover between firms with shared auditors. Our context involves firms receiving U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission comment letters on issues relating to the recognition of revenue, gains, or losses (RRGL) in their 10-K filings and subsequently engaging in a higher degree of accounting conservatism. Investors of firms who did not receive a comment letter but share auditors with RRGL comment letter recipients react adversely to the release of these comment letters. Through the threat of downward stock price pressure on the value of Chief Financial Officers' equity compensation, investors induce the nonrecipients to also engage in a higher degree of accounting conservatism. When exposed to higher reputation and litigation risks, the shared auditors further contribute to the behavioral spillover between their clients by acting as informational intermediaries.

本文研究了投资者在具有共享审计师的公司之间的行为溢出中的监控作用。我们的背景是，涉及收到美国证券交易委员会（SEC）关于10-K申报中与收入，收益或损失（RRGL）的确认有关的问题的评论信的公司，随后从事更高程度的会计保守性。没有收到评论信但与RRGL评论信接收人共享审计师的公司的投资者对这些评论信的发布有不利的反应。通过股价下跌对首席财务官股权补偿价值的威胁，投资者诱使非受赠人也进行了更高程度的会计保守性。当面临更高的声誉和诉讼风险时，