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Predicting strategic medical choices: An application of a quantal response equilibrium choice model
Journal of Choice Modelling ( IF 4.164 ) Pub Date : 2021-02-27 , DOI: 10.1016/j.jocm.2021.100282
Ge Ge , Geir Godager

Quantal response equilibrium choice (QREC) models are structural behavioral models that account for bounded rationality and strategic interactions in analyses of games where each player’s payoff is a vector. We revisit the question of how market competition affects pro-social behavior and fit a QREC model to data from an incentivized laboratory experiment, where participants make decisions on medical treatments for abstract patients in monopoly, duopoly, and quadropoly games. Our results demonstrate that competition can cause substantial behavioral responses without any changes in pro-social preferences if one allows for the possibility that competition influences the degree of randomness in decision making.

We find that a QREC model with fixed preference parameters provides precise out-of-sample predictions of behavior in games with vector payoffs. A Monte Carlo study is performed to show that the two-step estimator is accurate.



中文翻译:

预测战略性医疗选择:定量反应均衡选择模型的应用

量子响应均衡选择(QREC)模型是结构性行为模型,在对每个玩家的收益都是矢量的游戏分析中考虑了有限的理性和战略互动。我们重新审视的市场竞争如何影响亲社会行为的问题,从实验室的诱因实验,参与者做出医疗决策抽象的患者适合QREC模型数据垄断双寡头,和quadropoly游戏。我们的结果表明,如果竞争允许决策影响随机性的可能性,那么竞争可以引起实质性的行为反应,而亲社会偏好不会发生任何变化。

我们发现具有固定偏好参数的QREC模型可提供具有向量收益的游戏行为的精确样本外预测。进行了蒙特卡洛研究,表明两步估算器是准确的。

更新日期:2021-03-18
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