Recently, Daghigh et al. proposed some isogeny-based key agreement protocols in Bull. Iran. Math. Soc. 43 (2017), no. 4, 77-88. They claimed that their key exchange protocols based on supersingular isogenies provide the same security level as the Jao et al.’s protocol SIDH. This paper addresses first a vulnerability of these protocols to a key manipulation attack. Hence, unlike the security claims of Daghigh et al., these protocols unfortunately do not provide the same security when compared with SIDH. Second, we show in particular that the secret dual isogenies of the protocols can easily be retrieved by applying our key manipulation attack. We also discuss lastly the countermeasures to this attack.

最近，Daghigh等。在Bull中提出了一些基于异构的密钥协商协议。伊朗。数学。Soc。43（2017），否。4，第77-88页。他们声称，他们基于超奇异性异构体的密钥交换协议提供的安全级别与Jao等人的协议SIDH相同。本文首先解决了这些协议对密钥操纵攻击的脆弱性。因此，与Daghigh等人的安全性声明不同，不幸的是，与SIDH相比，这些协议没有提供相同的安全性。其次，我们特别表明，通过应用我们的密钥操作攻击，可以轻松地检索出协议的秘密双重同质性。最后，我们还将讨论针对这种攻击的对策。