Beware of Safety Journal: Analytic Philosophy Manuscript ID APHI-Dec-2017-OA-083.R2 Wiley - Manuscript type: Original Article Keywords: safety, sensitvity, knowledge, epistemology, epistemic interest Abstract: Safety, as discussed in contemporary epistemology, is a feature of true beliefs. Safe beliefs, when formed by the same method, remain true in close-by possible worlds. I argue that our beliefs being safely true serves no recognisable epistemic interest and, thus, that this notion of safety should play no role in epistemology. Epistemologists have been misled by failing to distinguish between a feature of beliefs — being safely true — and a feature of believers, namely being safe from error. The latter is central to our epistemic endeavours: we want to be able to get right answers, whatever they are, to questions of interest. I argue that we are sufficiently safe from error (in some relevant domain) by being sufficiently sensitive (to relevant distinctions).

中文翻译：

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注意安全

小心安全期刊：分析哲学手稿 ID APHI-Dec-2017-OA-083.R2 Wiley - 手稿类型：原创文章关键词：安全、敏感性、知识、认识论、认识论兴趣摘要：安全，正如在当代认识论中所讨论的，是真实信念的一个特征。安全信念，当以相同的方法形成时，在附近的可能世界中仍然是真实的。我认为，我们的信念是安全真实的，不符合可识别的认识论利益，因此，这种安全概念不应在认识论中发挥作用。认识论者因未能区分信仰的特征——安全地真实——和信徒的特征——避免错误而被误导。后者是我们认知努力的核心：我们希望能够对感兴趣的问题得到正确的答案，无论它们是什么。